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I. THE THEORETICAL CHALLENGE OF MARGINAL ECONOMIES 
A specter is haunting the developed world, the specter of marginal . 
economies1. It is a real ghost, duly buried and eulogized, but it is 
back and spooking the high priests of industrialization, modernization 
and economic development. The size and importance of marginal economies 
both in socialism and capitalism is, by now, the subject of a large body 
of research. Marginal economies are often discussed under such labels as 
underground, subterranean, submerged, second or informal economies. 
These terms refer to a set of economic institutions that do not conform 
to the logic of industrial mass-production in either market capitalist 
or state socialist societies. 
In recent years sociologists began to develop an interest in 
rational choice models.(For critical reactions see Oberschall and Leifer 
1986 and Hirsch et al. 1987.) This approach is carrying two related 
promises. First, it promises to turn the structuralist tide in 
sociology, as the rational choice approach looks at individuals as 
actors, .rather than just playthings of social forces; it conceives of 
them as people with wills, intentions, goals and purposes2. Second, some 
-- 
1 Teodor Shanin calls marginal economies "expoliary" economies. 
[Shanin 19881 
2 The rationality is used both as a prescriptive and a descriptive 
concept. Usually there is a 'division of labor' which deploys the 
normative concept at the individual level and the descriptive notion at 
the aggregate level (March 1986). But only when it is used in a 
normative sense, does rationality allow for choice and can it avoid the 
overdetermined world of structuralist sociology (Wrong 1961). Were 
rationality a description of how things are, were it a description of 
the operating rule of society that forces us all to behave in certain 
ways, it would lead us back to a structuralism, back to an individual 
robbed of his choices, intentions and freedom. 
Still, a descriptive concept of rationality could serve as model, 
or ideal type, to which one can compare reality. In this comparison 
correspondence or lack of correspondence to this model can provide new 
insights into the underlying structure of decision making. 
sociologists believe [~oleman 19861 these models could provide the link 
that explains how individual action constitutes societal phenomena as 
opposed to the structuralist model where societal level phenomena impose 
on individuals. 
There are very few areas in sociological research where this link 
is more sorely missing than in research on the margins. In most other 
areas, actors associate, create or use organizations which mediate 
between them and the polity, economic structure or overall culture of 
society. In the core, people have their clubs, unions, associations, 
lobbies, newspapers, representatives, forums and conferences which put 
them into contact with other people living at considerable physical 
distances, with people who happen to share one or two characteristics of 
theirs, but not their lives. As a consequence, these people hold 
operative ideas, conceptions and values about the larger institutions of 
society and even about society in general. 
The margins are different. Far from being atomized, marginal 
economies are local economies and marginal actors rarely have 
organizations. They themselves hold no beliefs about how their lives or 
actions can influence society in general, because they rarely get a 
3 chance to enter the stage as corporate or even as collective actors . 
3 I make a distinction between corporate, collective and aggregate 
actors. Corporate actors are legal entities, with formalized internal 
structure. They have their interests of their own that can be completely 
divorced from the interests of the individuals constituting it. 
Membership and authority is clearly defined [Coleman 19741. Collective 
actors act together with a common purpose somehow negotiated among them. 
Collective actors form coalitions rather than corporations. Aggregate 
actors, on the other hand, act individually, but their actions produce 
an aggregate result. Even though aggregate actors act as individuals, 
they do not act alone. In other words, in their actions they recognize 
actions of other individuals, present and past. Their actions are 
contingent on the circumstances they find themselves in, which are the 
result of actions of others in the past, and they adjust their behavior 
to actors, corporate, collective or aggregate, they face in the present. 
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Studies of the unionized working class interested, say, in the 
relationship between what workers do and did and how the welfare state 
developed can and should draw on the history of unions and other labor 
organizations, that most commonly linked the individual worker to 
political change. Students of marginal workers do not have this option. 
Furthermore, the lack of organizational and ideological linkage between 
individuals and macro-level institutions not only deprives the scholar 
of an important tool of analysis, but it also inhibits the development 
of a macro-horizon for marginal actors. Indeed, their actions, aggregate 
"behind their backs". To understand how that happens is a mighty 
challenge. In this paper, rather than applying the rational choice 
approach to some specific example, I will consider some of the limits of 
rational choice theories in marginal economies. I will argue that the 
narrow concept of calculative rationality requires a certain kind of 
institutional environment. In marginal economies these institutions are 
not present, thus the individual cannot and do not take advantage of the 
decision rules rational choice postulates. 
No one aggregate actor has enough power to influence the aggregate 
outcome [Schelling 19781. On a completely free labor-market workers act 
as aggregate actors, when they begin to organize they become collective 
actors and once they form unions they constitute themselves as corporate 
actors . 
It is also important to see that the same group of people can act 
as corporate, collective or aggregate actor, depending on the situation. 
Consider the residents of a metropolitan area, who act as a corporate 
actor when they commission the construction of an airport, as collective 
actors when they demonstrate against a nuclear plant to be built in 
their vicinity and as aggregate actors when they drive around town 
creating traffic problems. 
Furthermore, corporate actors at a lower level can be aggregate 
actors at a higher level (but not the other way around). Industrial 
firms [corporate actors], for instance, are aggregate actors on a 
competitive market or when it comes to pollution or protection of the 
environment. 
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11. WHAT IS MARGINAL ECONOMY ? A POSITIVE, INSTITUTIONAL DEFINITION 
Studies of marginal economies cover baby-sitting pools and 
prostitution, artisans and subsistence farming, do-it-yourself and 
neighborhood help, scavenging and free-lance tutoring. 
Most of the common elements of this motley bunch are simple 
contradistinctions against the prevailing mode of large-scale, 
bureaucratic production. It is very likely that as the phenomenon 
develops our theoretical efforts will begin to focus more on the 
internal dissimilarities of these forms and the term 'marginal' will be 
replaced by a much more detailed nomenclature. 
Still, there are some positively identifying characteristics of 
these economies which can be grasped at different levels. At the 
individual level one could see marginal economies as particular labor 
market' strategies. In less developed countries a large part -- often the 
larger part -- of the population earn their livelihood outside the job- 
system. In the service sector street vendors, shoeshines, day-workers, 
fixers, pushers and hustlers try to make ends meet as labor 
entrepreneurs, less by choice than by necessity, mostly because of the 
lack of employment. In small-scale production we find traditional 'self- 
employed' artisans, like shoemakers, handicraftsmen, weavers, tailors of 
all sorts, but also small family farmers, herb and-mushroom gatherers 
and fishermen. All of them live and work from day to day, without the 
security and shackles of employment contracts. They rarely possess any 
formal organization to protect themselves or to represent common 
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interests, but this also make them elusive and invisible to the powers 
that be. 
'Off-the-books' labor or "Schwarzarbeit', is flourishing in 
Western countries as well. In the early 1980s about 8% of the workers in 
the Federal Republic of Germany had undeclared paying jobs. This 
proportion was estimated to be twice as high in Sweden. In France over a 
million workers tried their luck outside the job-system, and in Italy 
estimates range from 2 to 4 million (De Grazia, 1982). Unemployment, 
insufficient wages, boredom on the job, high taxes, strong unions, the 
inflexibility of the job-system share the responsibility for the steady 
increase in the numbers of people turning to alternative ways of 
utilizing their labor. In socialist economies the list of reasons skips 
unemployment, but contains new items, such as inflexible and depressed 
wages, the physical unavailability of basic necessities, like food and 
shelter, shortage of and the poor quality of consumer goods and 
4 services . 
By approaching marginal economies from this perspective one will 
end up with a colorful collection of beggars and private architects, 
after-work gardeners and moonlighting plumbers, homeworking women and 
moonshine distillers, free-lance artists and little children peddling 
Chicelets and candy. Taking a macro-economic perspective, the margins 
are a complement to the core, and one can define the margins through a 
series of functional and dysfunctional interdependences. The margins can 
be seen as a depository of a 'surplus population', an army of potential 
- 
4 Shortage, as opposed to scarcity, means that the reason for the 
unavailability of goods or services is not the lack of the means to 
procure them, but their physical absence. Citizens of socialist 
countries often have the purchasing power to buy, yet what they want is 
absent. The producer of missing services or goods in socialism, 
therefore, faces a large, pent-up demand. [~ornai 19801 
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laborers standing by, whose existence disciplines the 'lucky ones', who 
were admitted into the job-system [~attera 19851. Others contend that 
the margins are filling the cracks of mass-production. Small and 
flexible, marginal economies can better cope with risk, provide 
customized services and production and are cheaper to operate [piore and 
Sabel 19841. Some emphasize the autonomous viability of marginal 
economies, and some stress that marginal economies are often appendages 
of mass production and large producers externalize some of their costs 
at the expense of the margins, which makes them indispensable in a 
system of large-scale production. 
However, the most fruitful approach, to my mind, is an 
institutional one. One can define marginal economies through their 
institutional characteristics, i.e. through the most important rules 
people follow in marginal economies. I propose the following ones: 
1. Marginal economies lack the tendency to grow and they have a 
peculiar form of accumulation which tends to be social rather than 
economic. In most cases, this no-growth tendency is not just a whim, but 
a result of clear obstacles. The limits could be self-exploitation, 
uncertainty both of the political and economic kind, restricted 
availability of capital or technology. But marginal economies are not 
producing for the sake of expanding production. The moonlighter does not 
moonlight to be able to moonlight more. Yet, there is a form of 
accumulation taking place in marginal economies. In rural labor 
exchanges, where families are helping each other with building homes or 
doing the harvest, a strange sort of accumulation takes place: an 
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'accumulation' of trust, respect and obligation. This accumulation is 
necessary for carrying out the economic activity. One will not be able 
to build his house, if he did not help others, when they needed help. 
There are other, more individualistic ways of social accumulation. Many 
participants in the margins 'invest' in their children, or their 
prestige through conspicuous consumption, if they belong to the more 
fortunate part of the margins. Yet, this accumulation does not take 
place according to a rational calculus. People feel that these 
investments are useful but the actual utility of these investments 
compared to other possible ones is highly uncertain. 
2. The second feature is that the household and business are not 
separate, and it is the household budget that serves as the matrix of 
economic calculation. This is true for simple wage labor too, as factory 
workers try to maximize the return on their labor power considering the 
interests of their household. In a large business only the owner makes a 
distinction between his household and business budget. Yet, the wage 
laborer's economic calculations rarely involve production decisions. 
Wage workers can choose only between menus, while the workers on the 
margins can cook. Moreover the household is not just the matrix of 
calculation, but often turns into the locus of production, as well. 
Household farmers, homeworkers, typists who take home their after-hours 
work operate at home, and even street vendors keep their supplies where 
they are living. 
3. Marginal economies use little capital and usually need little 
material input, and the importance of labor input is almost exclusive5. 
Indeed the biggest assets a marginal worker can possess are skill, time 
and physical aptitude. 
4. These economies operate by an informal internal organization or 
rather, without formal internal organization. This is what makes them so 
hard to tax, regulate or control by central authorities. And conversely, 
criminalization or any other attempt of interfering abets informality, 
by making the creation of a formal organization impossible or just too 
costly. 
5. Finally, marginal units are incredibly flexible. They can 
spring up or disappear, switch products or line of services as 
conditions permit or demand. This is partly the result of their scant 
use of capital. They are also flexible at using labor, for instance 
household farming can use any fraction of time a person can spare to 
attend to the pigs, collect the eggs, clean the cow stable. All these 
can be done in the evening between dinner and the nightly news on TV. In 
general, time-use at the margins is more task than 'clock oriented', and 
thus workers are not trapped in the rigidities of highly structured 
industrial time. 
5 There are some exceptions, like trafficking in gold or expensive 
contraband, but those are usually larger operations, involving 
'employers' and 'employees', and just because they are illegal I would 
not necessarily treat them as marginal economies. However, illegality 
usually constrains size and -- as no formal contract can be enforced 
among the participants, it fosters an informal organization. 
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Marginal economies are geared to be able to operate outside the 
legally protected sphere of the market. Some forms like subsistence 
farming or do-it-yourself avoid the legally sanctioned market 
altogether. Other forms like street vendors, moonlighters or home- 
workers participate in the market but without legal protection. In 
socialist economies the legally protected market is replaced by 
bureaucratic redistribution a different kind of a formally protected 
system of exchange. A formally protected system of exchange creates the 
security that allows for productive accumulation. The first and third 
characteristics of marginal economies are related to the lack of this 
security. But for formally protected systems of exchange to operate it 
has to create explicit rules and clear boundaries that isolates 
production from other aspects of human life. The second, fourth and 
fifth characteristics reflect the absence these clear boundaries. 
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111. RATIONALITY AND MARGINAL ECONOMIES 
A. BROAD AND NARROW OR CALCULATIVE CONCEPT OF RATIONALITY 
While the literature on marginal economies driven by the interest 
of the State to measure, tax and regulate gives ample consideration to 
their overall volume6, to the best of my knowledge, there is little 
theoretical or empirical research on the kind of individual or micro- 
level logic actors in marginal economies follow. Will rational choice 
theory help us understanding marginal economies ? Thus the theoretical 
question I pose is: what is the nature of economic rationality and 
"calculation" and what role can they play in marginal economies ? 
Any course of action can be seen as a link between certain initial 
givens and a particular set of final outcomes. Rational action'is one 
kind of such an active link. It is necessary, though not sufficient, for 
an act to be rational to serve its purpose. In fact, mostly it is simply 
a claim of adequacy, a much weaker.claim than either optimality (you 
cannot get better) or unicity (you found the best) [Elster 19811. The 
claim of adequaca still leaves us with the question of why the actor 
did no better or why she did not choose another, equally optimal course 
of action. To give rationality will empirical content we have to 
independently ascertain the intention of the actor and compare it to the 
outcome of her action. 
6 See for instance, Gaertner and Wenig 1985, Tanzi 1982, or 
Schroeder and Greenslade 1979 
7 Adequacy is the result of 'satisficing' behavior [Simon 19781. 
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This notion of rationality is still very naive, and even in its 
crudest forms it is always complemented by some consistent$ criterion. 
Rational actors act not only with a reason but they pursue their goals 
with "method". Most of the analytical treatments of rationality 
emphasize this point of consistency, sometimes to the detriment of 
considerations of adequacy or optimality. It is perfectly conceivable 
that an act is completely consistent yet it does not serve its purpose, 
or that it results in suboptimal results, as in the famous Prisoner 
Dilemma. In this example the incentives are structured in a way that 
each prisoner following the rules of rational decision making will end 
up worse then he would had both of them violated these decision rules. 
Yet, given the other person's choice the rational decision yields always 
better results, which illustrates that the optimality of consistent 
systems hinges on what is taken as exogenous or given. If cooperation or 
solidarity rather than opportunism is taken as given in the two 
prisoners, they can reach the optimal solution following consistent 
decision rules. 
Rationality can be either real or conceptual. It can be seen both 
as a pattern of behavior and a method of modelling what people do. The 
distinction between real and conceptual rationality is an important one. 
We can ask whether people are actually consciously following a rational 
course of action. In this case rationality is an empirical question and 
empirical evidence will decide whether or not they are rational 
according to some criteria. 
8 In fact, adequacy can be seen as a consistency criterion itself. 
It asserts the consistency of the outcome with the actor's preferences. 
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Rationality is also a modelling technique, a conceptual device. As 
a language with its own syntax and vocabulary it treats people "as if" 
they were rational. In this case, rationality is not an empirical issue 
any more; rather it is a tool of simplification. In this simplification 
subjectivity is assumed away. People get reduced to the shortest 
explanatory link between the initial givens and final outcomes. It is a 
language replacing the language of causality. All actions are or can be 
modelled as rational. For instance, tipping the ambulance doctor, 
frequent in Hungary, can be explained as rational, because the person 
feels the discomfort of desperation and the act of handing over a couple 
of banknotes gives some relief from an intense anxiety, even though 
there is nothing the ambulance can do differently depending on the tip. . 
Explanations of this kind can be manufactured for just about anything. 
In this sense rationality means simply that the causes of the act are 
thought to be known. Taken in this sense, rationality becomes something 
describing not the action itself, but the state of our inquiry into the 
action. It means that we understand the causes of the action and we 
assume these causes to be the actor's own real intentions. 
In economic theory the actor is rational if she manages to 
maximize some utility dear to her heart. Modern neo-classical economic 
theory takes institutions, available technologies, endowments and 
preferences as exogenous variables. Once these are given, the process of 
deciding becomes a matter of analytical modelling developed from game 
theory, probability theory and statistical principles. 
Since people can rarely foresee the future, models bow to realism 
and conceive of the functions, not in terms of actual, but expected 
utility. Uncertainty is included in the model in the form of 
probabilities. Expected utility,-- the average utility one would achieve 
in the long run -- is then simply calculated as the product of the 
utility value and the probability assigned to it. Once the utilities and 
probabilities are thought to be known and we have decided which utility 
function to fit, we can relate the initial givens with the final outcome 
by finding the course of action yielding the highest expected utility. 9 
The-procedures used assume that there are no values of the 
exogenous variables that make maximization inappropriate. There are no 
preferences, no endowments, no technologies and, most importantly, no 
institutional contexts (i.e. sets of rules) that would render this kind 
of modelling impossible or useless. As Gary Becker put it: 
"... all human behavior can be viewed as involving 
participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of 
preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information 
and other inputs in a variety of markets." (Becker 1986, 
p.119) 
But if all human behavior can be viewed as rational then 
rationality as an empirical concept becomes vacuous. If rational models 
can be built for any social phenomenon with equal plausibility, how do 
we explain that in certain circumstances they seem like so real that 
people begin to use them in their decision making, and in others they 
look forced and nobody in his right mind would sit down to do the 
prescribed calculations ? Rational choice models are appropriate in 
situations where the actors themselves are able to build and use such 
9 Maximizing expected utility is a procedure that has certain 
intellectually pleasing characters. It is based on simple and quite 
plausible principles and it is able to make its formulations usefully in 
mathematical terms. (For the axioms see Luce and Raiffa 1957 pp.23-31. ) 
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models. Social settings where real rationality is possible, but not 
necessarily present, can be analyzed well with rational choice models. 
In settings where real rationality can be imputed only post hoc, as an 
exercise in modelling one should not expect much from these models. 10 
Are rational choice models useful under the institutional 
conditions of marginal economies ? 
B. RATIONALITY AND INSTITUTIONS 
Institutions are sets of rules or logics. I have drawn the 
boundaries of the marginal economy in terms.of its peculiar rules. Neo- 
classical economist believe that once their homo oeconomicus understands 
the institutional context of his action together with the other givens, 
utility maximization can be applied. 
Recent developments in institutional economics questioned this 
assumption (Williamson 1975). There must be a reason, institutional 
economists argue, that there exists a variety of institutional settings 
for economic transactions. They recognize that there is a relationship 
between institutional arrangements and the efficiency that rationality 
produces. In other word, they have noticed that under certain 
institutional conditions rational decision making leads to inefficient 
or undesirable results, that consistency will clash with adequacy. To 
demonstrate the problem I chose three obstacles to satisfactory 
rationality: improper motivation, uncertainty and excessive transaction 
cost. 
10 For a collection of such post hoc rationalizations see Becker and 
Stigler [I9771 and a for a refutation Simon [1978]. 
Coleman [1988] tries to find an alternative explanation to Olson's 
free-rider paradox [Olson 19651. How is it possible that in times of war 
there are people fighting' (some voluntarily, even with excess zeal) in 
the trenches, when the free-rider paradox would lead us to believe that 
nobody would? Simply, Coleman says, people are "encouraged" to fight and 
this encouragement mends the improper incentive structure. Then he 
elaborates how different types of networks can deliver positive and 
negative encouragement. However, without the intervention of these 
structures, no self-interested individual would fight for his country. 
Williamson [1981] claims that asset specificity will create need 
for long term relationships. If the nature of a transaction is such that 
it requires a big investment that cannot be converted to other uses, the 
supplier who has to make the investment has to trust his partner that 
their relationship will last, and the initial investment will be 
recovered with profit. Without that trust, secured by a legal contract, 
the transaction will never materialize. 
North [1977] reinterpreting Karl Polanyi, offers an 
institutionalist explanation on why certain societies did not develop 
markets by arguing, that the transaction cost of enforcing market rules 
is too high. Rational transactions under market rules would yield highly 
unsatisfying results. Thus "reciprocity societies can be considered as 
least-cost trading solutions where no system of enforcing the terms of 
exchange between trading units exists". [~orth 1977 p. 7131 The 
informality of marginal economies, thus can be seen as a rational, least 
cost solution to excessive transaction costs. 
However, in a functionalist manner, all three explanations assume 
that the needs of satisfactory rationality create the proper 
institutional arrangements when, in fact, the proper institutional 
arrangements are the precondition of such a rationality. If the 
institutional arrangements are not present rationality [rational 
calculation] cannot function. The frustration over the non-satisfactory 
results of rational calculation CAN be one of the motivating forces that 
create the institution that makes satisfactory rationality possible, 
however, as sociology teaches us, the development of institutions is a 
much more complex historical process. Indeed, when institutional 
economists explain institutions as a result of the rational urges of 
people, they have the causal order backwards. The laws and nationalistic 
fervor that "encourage" people in times of war to participate cannot be 
derived from the rationality of citizen participation in the war. In the 
absence of "encouragement" everybody would stay at home, including the 
enemy. Indeed, this would be a much more satisfactory solution. The 
legally binding long term contract is in the interest of the supplier, 
because that will lock his customer into the transaction. This explains, 
according to Williamson why these long term contracts exist, and why 
they replace market transactions in such instances. 
But the interest of the supplier really does not explain all why 
the contract come into being. The legally binding long term contract may 
be in the interest of the supplier, but it is precisely, because, it is 
against the interest of the customer to stick with the supplier unless 
penalized for deserting him. The customer would shop around, and choose 
the cheapest supplier each time. Opportunism, however, is overridden in 
this model by reference to long term mutual gains. Why would anybody 
sacrifice short term gains to longer term gains and what is the proper 
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length of terms is a question utilitarianism is unable to answer, and 
which makes this kind of analysis perfectly arbitrary. 
Finally, transaction costs, like any cost or price, are endogenous 
variables in economic theory. The transaction cost of enforcing property 
rights or legal contracts is the function of the endowments, 
technologies, preferences and institutions of the system. To put it 
differently, what cost is depends, among other things, on whether one 
lives in a market or reciprocity society. The transaction cost approach 
is also vague on who incurs the cost. Take labor as an example in the 
family and in the factory. Factory workers are legally contracted for 
their labor. The cost of enforcing labor contracts to the employer is 
small. To get your brother to help you to feed your pigs on a regular 
basis when he prefers to spend his time differently can be much more 
"expensive", because the personal dependence between brothers will raise 
costs that don't exist in a formal employment relationship. To keep 
within the language of this approach, there are "emotional costs", 
"security costs", "status costs", "costs of cohesion within the family" 
and so on. Furthermore, it is unclear who bears the transaction cost and 
why the losses of those actors are singled out. The objection I raised 
to Williamson's argument with respect to opportunism, and short and long 
term interest, applies here too. 
All three authors recognize that under certain institutional 
conditions rational calculation with satisfactory results becomes 
impossible (because of faulty incentive structure, uncertainty or 
excessive transaction cost), but they show that there are institutional 
solutions to these problems that will necessarily evolve out of the 
tension between the need for and the impossibility of rationality. 
But this is not how nationalism, states, long term legal contracts 
or markets develop. In East-European countries the Communist governments 
are changing laws to create a more stable environment for a large part 
of the marginal producers who until recently were barred from utilizing 
the legal system and who not infrequently faced ideological and even 
criminal persecution. Uncertainty had prevailed, but the new laws 
created a new set of uncertainties. First, change se, is a source of 
uncertainty, at least in the short run. People knew their ways in the 
old system, when and how to bribe officials, how much to ask for goods 
and services delivered to private customers. Now they have to learn new 
ways. Second, the new .situation created new uncertainties. In Hungary 
these reforms were linked to the introduction of the personal income 
tax. Before, what you made on the margins was yours; now you have to 
hide it from the tax man. Third, uncertainties abound on the side of the 
Communist authorities, as well. By acknowledging the need for non-State 
sector activities they erode their ideological basis, lose control over 
the planning process, as well as their work-force, and they may allow 
the development of a new elite which eventually might contest their 
power directly.[~ona- as 19891 Of course, one could feel that old 
uncertainties were worse than new ones, that is one could have 
preferences for a certain type of ambiguity. But the ambiguity 
preferences of the East-European Communist elites are far from unified, 
which in turn introduces yet a new element of uncertainty. 
It is also not true, that the same problem necessarily leads to 
the same solution. Williamson [1975] argues, that uncertainty will 
increase bureaucratization. But the solution to a problem within one 
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institutional context can be the source of that very same problem in a 
different one. As an example of the context-dependent nature of the 
relationship between institutions and uncertainty, Stark [1986] 
describes the enterprise business work partnerships [EBwP] in Hungary. 
EBWP's are voluntary brigades that subcontract certain tasks in their 
off hours from their firms. EBWPs get the jobs through competitive 
bidding. In a planned economy, Stark argues, the main source of 
uncertainty is the bureaucratic planning process with its bottlenecks, 
shortages, seemingly capricious changes in directives etc. . To decrease 
this uncertainty, managers can resort to market-like transactions. 
Another example is the 'fabbrica diffusa', the extended system of 
subcontracting in Italy. Large firms find it not just less expensive, 
but more calculable to farm out work tasks ranging from motorcycle 
engine part production to garment and shoe manufacturing, because the 
failure of one of the small suppliers is of little consequence and 
substitution is easy to find, while accumulating a large workforce in 
one unit brings all the perils of organized strikes.[Mattera 1985, 
Brusco 19821 To sum it up: the proper institutional environment is the 
precondition of rationality and not a consequence of it. Institutions 
are not created solely by needs for rational action. Institutions within 
different contexts can have different value for rationally minded 
actors . 
The standard literature on rational decision making or rational 
choice, in my opinion, ignores the fact that rationality is a "luxury", 
made possible by and contingent upon certain institutional arrangements. 
Calculative rationality requires a legally protected system of exchange. 
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Even if it is inherent in the human mind, either as a potentiality or as 
an actuality, or if it is an underlying metaphysical reality, what makes 
it feasible or useful is a set of historically evolved institutional 
arrangements that allow the basic notions of economic rationality to 
operate. Whenever those institutional preconditions are not given, the 
formulations of rational choice as tools of decision-making become 
useless, the calculations based on them become impossible. The only 
utility rational choice may preserve in such circumstances is the 
utility of a failed model which in its failure could yield new 
theoretical insights. 
IV. THREE PROBLEMS WITH RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY IN MARGINAL ECONOMIES 
At this point I will raise three questions touching on the three 
elements of expected utility theory which stand at the heart of rational 
choice models: utilities, probabilities and the possibility of long term 
expectations. For the model to be calculable all three elements must be 
present11. I am going to discuss, 1. the problem of intractable 
utilities, 2. the problem of unique events and 3. the problem of term 
expectations. 
11 There is a growing literature on decision making under ambiguous 
circumstances. In those cases, however, there are several equally 
rational strategies. [~c~enna 19861 
A. INTRACTABLE UTILITIES 
How is it possible to assign effective utilities to goods or 
services when those goods or services have no alternative use, when they 
have no exchange value ? Domestic labor, for instance, understood in the 
broadest possible way to include work in the family business, can be 
assigned shadow prices based on different calculations. But there are 
many different ways of performing these calculations and one arrives at 
very different results depending on the method chosen [~awrylyshyn 1978, 
Goldschrnidt-Clermont 19821. This is as much a theoretical as a 
methodological point. 
Intractable utilities, of course, do not mean that these things 
are not valued or useful or desired or avoided. It simply means that 
these values simply do not 'lend themselves to rational calculation in 
this very narrow sense. In fact, utilities are tractable only in 
situations where there is exchange among several independent economic 
agents with goods that can be substituted for by other goods. This is a 
special case of the market. To the extent to which marginal economies do 
not participate in such a market at all, they are faced with the problem 
of intractable utilities. Labor exchange in residential construction and 
agricultural harvest in rural Hungary until recently had been based on 
the reciprocity of mutual help [Sik 19841. The value of one's friend's 
labor was incalculable, because there was no alternative way of getting 
the work done with a professional, and for the helper there was no 
alternative to lending a hand to the neighbor or relative in need. 
Recently, as market for labor and consumer services expanded, people are 
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increasingly likely to calculate the pros and cons of employing someone 
for money or to buy their obligations to others off. Nevertheless, most 
of the labor exchange is still built on reciprocity, where "accounting" 
is done in rough terms of time spent working, a measure of justice, 
rather than a measure of utility. 
B. UNIQUE EVENTS 
How is it possible to assign effective probabilities to future 
"economic" events ? Standard treatments of probability in game theory 
always assume a priori probabilities. A priori probabilities are very 
convenient but very hard to come by in real life. Flipping fair coins, 
playing cards or the lottery and throwing dice comprise a very small 
segment a human life. Most of the time, when we talk about probabilities 
in the real world, we have to fall back on a posteriori probabilities. 
One need not get entangled in the philosophical problem, that this 
method does not allow for the concept of a "future", -- since future is 
conceived as the most likely past ahead of us, -- even though induction 
from past to future is especially problematic in the case of historical 
events. To describe the future as an objective probability distribution 
means that the future in principle is knowable and is independent of the 
autonomous decisions of human agents [O1~riscoll and Rizzo 1985 p.4.1. 
At this point the theory revokes agency from humans and sinks the ship 
it travels on. The basic assumption, even more, the raison d'etre of the 
theoretical enterprise, -- human choice -- goes down like the Titanic. 
It is sufficient to note that these. calculations assume that the 
event on hand is not unique. Either itself or something similar had 
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already happened before, not once, not twice but several times. In 
Eastern Europe, for instance, to enter the legally sanctioned second 
economy one has to assess the probability that next month all private 
activities will be denounced as anti-socialist. A protective and 
credible legal system is necessary to create the continuity that is 
necessary to draw on past experience and thus to predict the future. To 
assess the likelihood of an event we have to define a set of similar 
events. Similarity and repetition is not a property residing in the 
events themselves. They are the results of a standardization process 
that can be either conceptual or institutional or both. We can see 
something as repetitive because our intellect grasps some underlying 
similarity. Many times there are institutional mechanisms that 
standardize events, that make them similar, comparable, repetitive. One 
example is bookkeeping. Bookkeeping allows us to treat objects as 
similar, because it reduces them to simple categories. The question is 
whether treating a hammer as inventory will or will not suffice in our 
economic action. Can we discard the other details, for instance its 
color, size or weight ? Marginal economies often 'suffer' from the 
problem of uniqueness. Because the economic transaction is not isolated 
from other aspects of human life, the complexity of each situation is 
far greater than in the standardized world of industrial mass- 
production. This is not to say that in marginal economies everything is 
unique. Uniqueness is a matter of perspective. A marriage is a unique 
event for the person, but it is just another case for the demographer. 
All depends on what one believes to be the smallest detail that still 
has significant pra.ctica1 value in a given situation. 
C. LONG TERM EXPECTATIONS 
Rational choice is a long-term strategy where people maximize 
expected utilities in the long run. But, as Keynes mercilessly put it, 
"in the long run, we will all be dead". This is especially true for 
marginal economies. Most marginal economies, as opposed to large scale 
mass production, cannot wait out the long run. As Chayanov [I9861 and 
later Scott [I9761 has pointed out in the context of the peasant 
subsistence economy, these economies lead a precarious existence, trying 
to minimize disaster as opposed to maximizing expected gains. 
What from one angle appears as flexibility can be seen from 
another as fragility. This fragility is one of the important reasons why 
marginal economies do not expand, do not accumulate productive resources 
even when they would have the resources to do so. The major source of 
this fragility, this "short-term" frame of mind depends on the dominant 
political economy. In socialism, the main threat to the survival of 
marginal economies is political, the constant insecurity of an end of 
toleration by an ideologically hostile regime. In capitalism, marginal 
economies do not face such risks. There, the main threat to their 
survival is the market, where forces beyond the marginal actor's control 
are at work. In socialism, market risk is.virtually non-existent because 
of the constant shortages generated by the .core of these economies. 
Being supply constrained, these economies favor sellers over buyers, and 
therefore in economic terms marginal economies in socialism are mostly 
prosperous. 
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The reason why utilities are tractable and why events can be seen 
as similar or "standardized" and why long-term strategies are possible 
in the core is that there are a series of institutions that create 
tractable utilities and standardized events. The market, bookkeeping and 
bureaucratic administration, modern law, the credentialling system are 
all institutions that maintain the possibility of rational calculation. 
These together with large-scale production, standardized products, mass- 
markets and the stability of core firms leave a larger space for 
rational calculation. Of course, marginal economies are not excluded 
from many of these institutions, yet they make much less use of them. 
Furthermore, marginal economies are not isolated from the core. They do 
business with it, they depend on it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Marginal economies are embedded in the social fabric of human 
life. This creates serious difficulties for calculative rationality by 
creating ambiguity, complexity and uniqueness, which prevents humans of 
bounded rationality to trust their fates to utility functions. Only when 
the economy becomes institutionally isolated from the totality of life 
does such rational calculation become possible. Then problems become 
isolated from the countless different aspects of human life and become 
amenable to calculative rationality. 
I believe that the institutional separation of the economic from 
the rest of society's concerns starts with the separation of the work- 
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place and the living space, the household and the business [~eber 19781 
and it has been promoted by the increase in scale and complexity. 
Polanyi recognized that the complexities of industrial production 
required the comrnoditization'of land, labor and money and thus the 
expansion of the market from the narrowly defined field of commerce to 
the whole of industry and reached the conclusion that this was the 
"inevitable consequence of the factory system". [~olanyi 1944 p.751 Yet 
Polanyi's target was not the factory system or large-scale 
industrialization itself, but the market. 
Commoditization reduces the complexities of objects and humans to 
their exchange value. Hayek [1945] calls it the 'marvel' of market 
prices. Commoditization removes the social fabric from around neighbors, 
oranges, grandparents, crucifixes, homes, lunches, trees, dogs and 
dogcatchers and reduces them to a simple measurable quantity. In other 
words, it creates tractable and calculable utilities. Formalization is 
the parallel of commoditization in bureaucratic institutions. The 
analogue.of money is the pre-printed form. Formalization or 
classification reduces the complexities of individual objects the same 
way commoditization reduces the diversity of incommensurable use values 
to an exchange value. It defines similarities and thus erases the 
uniqueness of objects, people and events. Thus formalization is the 
precondition of predictability. How hard it is to create the necessary 
conditions for calculative rationality is readily apparent once we look 
.at the most commoditized and formalized core of the economy. Even there 
we find that transactions are embedded in social relations [~ranovetter 
19861 though to a lesser degree than they are in the margins. 12 
12 I believe that the problem of 'decision framing' that now receives 
attention in the psychological literature is the psychological aspect of 
Rational choice models have little utility for marginal actors 
because marginal economies lack the institutions that make calculative 
rationality possible. Rational choice models, therefore, have little 
utility for sociologists if they want to understand the intentions of 
marginal actors. From the sociological point of view rational choice 
does not provide a theoretical solution, but raises a new and 
fascinating problem: what are the institutional conditions under which 
calculative rationality makes sense, that is it is possible and leads to 
desirable results ? The persistence of marginal economies is a reminder 
that this problem cannot be swept under the rug of elegant analytical 
assumptions. 
this very same problem of embeddedness. Tversky and Kahnemann El9861 
have found that axioms of rational decision making are satisfied only in 
very transparent situations. Otherwise different framings or the 
contexts of analytically identical problems can create different 
perceptions of what is the most rational strategy. The question 
sociologists must ask: what allows for the existence of 'transparency' 
in the real world. 
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